Imported Upstream version 1.8.14upstream/1.8.14

1 files changed, 934 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt.c b/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..54fd5cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,934 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All Rights Reserved.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 
+ * Redistribution of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 
+ * Neither the name of Sun Microsystems, Inc. or the names of
+ * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ * from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ * 
+ * This software is provided "AS IS," without a warranty of any kind.
+ * ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONDITIONS, REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES,
+ * INCLUDING ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A
+ * PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE HEREBY EXCLUDED.
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. ("SUN") AND ITS LICENSORS SHALL NOT BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DAMAGES SUFFERED BY LICENSEE AS A RESULT OF USING, MODIFYING
+ * OR DISTRIBUTING THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS DERIVATIVES.  IN NO EVENT WILL
+ * SUN OR ITS LICENSORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY LOST REVENUE, PROFIT OR DATA,
+ * OR FOR DIRECT, INDIRECT, SPECIAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, INCIDENTAL OR
+ * PUNITIVE DAMAGES, HOWEVER CAUSED AND REGARDLESS OF THE THEORY OF
+ * LIABILITY, ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF OR INABILITY TO USE THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * EVEN IF SUN HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_CONFIG_H)
+# include <config.h>
+#endif
+#include <ipmitool/bswap.h>
+#include <ipmitool/log.h>
+#include "lanplus.h"
+#include "lanplus_crypt.h"
+#include "lanplus_crypt_impl.h"
+
+
+
+/*
+ * lanplus_rakp2_hmac_matches
+ * 
+ * param session holds all the state data that we need to generate the hmac
+ * param hmac is the HMAC sent by the BMC in the RAKP 2 message
+ *
+ * The HMAC was generated [per RFC2404] from : 
+ * 
+ *     SIDm     - Remote console session ID    
+ *     SIDc     - BMC session ID
+ *     Rm       - Remote console random number
+ *     Rc       - BMC random number
+ *     GUIDc    - BMC guid
+ *     ROLEm    - Requested privilege level (entire byte)
+ *     ULENGTHm - Username length
+ *     <UNAMEm> - Username (absent for null user names)
+ *
+ * generated by using Kuid.  I am aware that the subscripts on the values
+ * look backwards, but that's the way they are written in the specification.
+ *
+ * If the authentication algorithm is IPMI_AUTH_RAKP_NONE, we return success.
+ * 
+ * return 0 on success (the authcode matches)
+ *        1 on failure (the authcode does not match)
+ */
+int
+lanplus_rakp2_hmac_matches(const struct ipmi_session * session,
+		const uint8_t * bmc_mac, struct ipmi_intf * intf)
+{
+	uint8_t       * buffer;
+	int           bufferLength, i;
+	uint8_t       mac[20];
+	uint32_t      macLength;
+
+	uint32_t SIDm_lsbf, SIDc_lsbf;
+
+
+	if (session->v2_data.auth_alg == IPMI_AUTH_RAKP_NONE)
+		return 1;
+	
+	/* We don't yet support other algorithms */
+	assert(session->v2_data.auth_alg == IPMI_AUTH_RAKP_HMAC_SHA1);
+	
+
+	bufferLength =
+		4  +                       /* SIDm     */
+		4  +                       /* SIDc     */
+		16 +                       /* Rm       */
+		16 +                       /* Rc       */
+		16 +                       /* GUIDc    */
+		1  +                       /* ROLEm    */
+		1  +                       /* ULENGTHm */
+		strlen((const char *)session->username); /* optional */
+
+	buffer = malloc(bufferLength);
+	if (buffer == NULL) {
+		lprintf(LOG_ERR, "ipmitool: malloc failure");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Fill the buffer.  I'm assuming that we're using the LSBF representation of the
+	 * multibyte numbers in use.
+	 */
+
+	/* SIDm */
+	SIDm_lsbf = session->v2_data.console_id;
+	#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+	SIDm_lsbf = BSWAP_32(SIDm_lsbf);
+	#endif
+
+	memcpy(buffer, &SIDm_lsbf, 4);
+
+	/* SIDc */
+	SIDc_lsbf = session->v2_data.bmc_id;
+	#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+	SIDc_lsbf = BSWAP_32(SIDc_lsbf);
+	#endif
+	memcpy(buffer + 4, &SIDc_lsbf, 4);
+
+	/* Rm */
+	#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+		buffer[8 + i] = session->v2_data.console_rand[16 - 1 - i];
+	#else
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+		buffer[8 + i] = session->v2_data.console_rand[i];
+	#endif
+
+	/* Rc */
+	#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+		buffer[24 + i] = session->v2_data.bmc_rand[16 - 1 - i];
+	#else
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+		buffer[24 + i] = session->v2_data.bmc_rand[i];
+	#endif
+
+	/* GUIDc */
+	#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+		buffer[40 + i] = session->v2_data.bmc_guid[16 - 1 - i];
+	#else
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+		buffer[40 + i] = session->v2_data.bmc_guid[i];
+	#endif
+
+	/* ROLEm */
+	buffer[56] = session->v2_data.requested_role;
+
+	if (ipmi_oem_active(intf, "i82571spt")) {
+		/*
+		 * The HMAC calculation code in the Intel 82571 GbE
+		 * skips this bit!  Looks like a GbE bug, but we need
+		 * to work around it here anyway...
+		 */
+		buffer[56] &= ~0x10;
+	}
+
+	/* ULENGTHm */
+	buffer[57] = strlen((const char *)session->username);
+
+	/* UserName [optional] */
+	for (i = 0; i < buffer[57]; ++i)
+		buffer[58 + i] = session->username[i];
+
+	if (verbose > 2)
+	{
+		printbuf((const uint8_t *)buffer, bufferLength, ">> rakp2 mac input buffer");
+		printbuf((const uint8_t *)session->authcode, IPMI_AUTHCODE_BUFFER_SIZE, ">> rakp2 mac key");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The buffer is complete.  Let's hash.
+	 */
+	lanplus_HMAC(session->v2_data.auth_alg,
+				 session->authcode,
+				 IPMI_AUTHCODE_BUFFER_SIZE,
+				 buffer,
+				 bufferLength,
+				 mac,
+				 &macLength);
+
+	free(buffer);
+	buffer = NULL;
+
+
+	if (verbose > 2)
+	{
+		printbuf(mac, macLength, ">> rakp2 mac as computed by the remote console");
+	}
+
+	return (memcmp(bmc_mac, mac, macLength) == 0);
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * lanplus_rakp4_hmac_matches
+ * 
+ * param session holds all the state data that we need to generate the hmac
+ * param hmac is the HMAC sent by the BMC in the RAKP 4 message
+ *
+ * The HMAC was generated [per RFC2404] from : 
+ * 
+ *     Rm       - Remote console random number
+ *     SIDc     - BMC session ID
+ *     GUIDc    - BMC guid
+ *
+ * generated by using SIK (the session integrity key).  I am aware that the
+ * subscripts on the values look backwards, but that's the way they are
+ * written in the specification.
+ *
+ * If the authentication algorithm is IPMI_AUTH_RAKP_NONE, we return success.
+ * 
+ * return 1 on success (the authcode matches)
+ *        0 on failure (the authcode does not match)
+ *
+ */
+int
+lanplus_rakp4_hmac_matches(const struct ipmi_session * session,
+		const uint8_t * bmc_mac, struct ipmi_intf * intf)
+{
+	uint8_t       * buffer;
+	int           bufferLength, i;
+	uint8_t       mac[20];
+	uint32_t      macLength;
+	uint32_t      SIDc_lsbf;
+
+	if (ipmi_oem_active(intf, "intelplus")){
+		/* Intel BMC responds with the integrity Algorithm in RAKP4 */
+		if (session->v2_data.integrity_alg == IPMI_INTEGRITY_NONE)
+			return 1;
+
+		/* We don't yet support other algorithms */
+		assert(session->v2_data.integrity_alg == IPMI_INTEGRITY_HMAC_SHA1_96);
+	} else {
+		if (session->v2_data.auth_alg == IPMI_AUTH_RAKP_NONE)
+			return 1;
+
+		/* We don't yet support other algorithms */
+		assert(session->v2_data.auth_alg == IPMI_AUTH_RAKP_HMAC_SHA1);
+	}
+
+	bufferLength =
+		16 +   /* Rm    */
+		4  +   /* SIDc  */
+		16;    /* GUIDc */
+
+	buffer = (uint8_t *)malloc(bufferLength);
+	if (buffer == NULL) {
+		lprintf(LOG_ERR, "ipmitool: malloc failure");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Fill the buffer.  I'm assuming that we're using the LSBF representation of the
+	 * multibyte numbers in use.
+	 */
+
+	/* Rm */
+	#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+		buffer[i] = session->v2_data.console_rand[16 - 1 - i];
+	#else
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+		buffer[i] = session->v2_data.console_rand[i];
+	#endif
+
+
+	/* SIDc */
+	SIDc_lsbf = session->v2_data.bmc_id;
+	#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+	SIDc_lsbf = BSWAP_32(SIDc_lsbf);
+	#endif
+	memcpy(buffer + 16, &SIDc_lsbf, 4);
+	
+
+	/* GUIDc */
+	#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+		buffer[i +  20] = session->v2_data.bmc_guid[16 - 1 - i];
+	#else
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+		buffer[i +  20] = session->v2_data.bmc_guid[i];
+	#endif
+
+
+	if (verbose > 2)
+	{
+		printbuf((const uint8_t *)buffer, bufferLength, ">> rakp4 mac input buffer");
+		printbuf(session->v2_data.sik, 20l, ">> rakp4 mac key (sik)");
+	}
+
+
+	/*
+	 * The buffer is complete.  Let's hash.
+	 */
+	lanplus_HMAC((ipmi_oem_active(intf, "intelplus")) 
+	             ? session->v2_data.integrity_alg 
+	             : session->v2_data.auth_alg ,
+				 session->v2_data.sik,
+				 IPMI_SIK_BUFFER_SIZE,
+				 buffer,
+				 bufferLength,
+				 mac,
+				 &macLength);
+
+	if (verbose > 2)
+	{
+		printbuf(bmc_mac, macLength, ">> rakp4 mac as computed by the BMC");
+		printbuf(mac,     macLength, ">> rakp4 mac as computed by the remote console");
+	}
+
+
+
+	free(buffer);
+	buffer = NULL;
+	assert(macLength == 20);
+	return (memcmp(bmc_mac, mac, 12) == 0);
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * lanplus_generate_rakp3_auth_code
+ *
+ * This auth code is an HMAC generated with :
+ *
+ *     Rc         - BMC random number
+ *     SIDm       - Console session ID
+ *     ROLEm      - Requested privilege level (entire byte)
+ *     ULENGTHm   - Username length
+ *     <USERNAME> - Usename (absent for null usernames)
+ *
+ * The key used to generated the MAC is Kuid
+ *
+ * I am aware that the subscripts look backwards, but that is the way they are
+ * written in the spec.
+ * 
+ * param output_buffer [out] will hold the generated MAC
+ * param session       [in]  holds all the state data we need to generate the auth code
+ * param mac_length    [out] will be set to the length of the auth code
+ *
+ * returns 0 on success
+ *         1 on failure
+ */
+int
+lanplus_generate_rakp3_authcode(uint8_t * output_buffer,
+		const struct ipmi_session * session,
+		uint32_t * mac_length, struct ipmi_intf * intf)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	int input_buffer_length, i;
+	uint8_t * input_buffer;
+	uint32_t SIDm_lsbf;
+	
+
+	if (session->v2_data.auth_alg == IPMI_AUTH_RAKP_NONE)
+	{
+		*mac_length = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* We don't yet support other algorithms */
+	assert(session->v2_data.auth_alg == IPMI_AUTH_RAKP_HMAC_SHA1);
+
+	input_buffer_length =
+		16 + /* Rc       */
+		4  + /* SIDm     */
+		1  + /* ROLEm    */
+		1  + /* ULENGTHm */
+		strlen((const char *)session->username);
+
+	input_buffer = malloc(input_buffer_length);
+	if (input_buffer == NULL) {
+		lprintf(LOG_ERR, "ipmitool: malloc failure");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Fill the buffer.  I'm assuming that we're using the LSBF representation of the
+	 * multibyte numbers in use.
+	 */
+	
+	/* Rc */
+	#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+		input_buffer[i] = session->v2_data.bmc_rand[16 - 1 - i];
+	#else
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+		input_buffer[i] = session->v2_data.bmc_rand[i];
+	#endif
+
+	/* SIDm */
+	SIDm_lsbf = session->v2_data.console_id;
+	#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+	SIDm_lsbf = BSWAP_32(SIDm_lsbf);
+	#endif
+	memcpy(input_buffer + 16, &SIDm_lsbf, 4);
+	
+	/* ROLEm */
+	if (ipmi_oem_active(intf, "intelplus") || ipmi_oem_active(intf, "i82571spt"))
+		input_buffer[20] = session->privlvl;
+	else 
+		input_buffer[20] = session->v2_data.requested_role;
+
+	/* ULENGTHm */
+	input_buffer[21] = strlen((const char *)session->username);
+
+	/* USERNAME */
+	for (i = 0; i < input_buffer[21]; ++i)
+		input_buffer[22 + i] = session->username[i];
+
+	if (verbose > 2)
+	{
+		printbuf((const uint8_t *)input_buffer, input_buffer_length, ">> rakp3 mac input buffer");
+		printbuf((const uint8_t *)session->authcode, IPMI_AUTHCODE_BUFFER_SIZE, ">> rakp3 mac key");
+	}
+    
+	lanplus_HMAC(session->v2_data.auth_alg,
+				 session->authcode,
+				 IPMI_AUTHCODE_BUFFER_SIZE,
+				 input_buffer,
+				 input_buffer_length,
+				 output_buffer,
+				 mac_length);
+
+	if (verbose > 2)
+		printbuf((const uint8_t *)output_buffer, *mac_length, "generated rakp3 mac");
+
+	
+	free(input_buffer);
+	input_buffer = NULL;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * lanplus_generate_sik
+ *
+ * Generate the session integrity key (SIK) used for integrity checking 
+ * during the IPMI v2 / RMCP+ session
+ *
+ * This session integrity key is a HMAC generated with :
+ *
+ *     Rm         - Console generated random number
+ *     Rc         - BMC generated random number
+ *     ROLEm      - Requested privilege level (entire byte)
+ *     ULENGTHm   - Username length
+ *     <USERNAME> - Usename (absent for null usernames)
+ *
+ * The key used to generated the SIK is Kg if Kg is not null (two-key logins are
+ * enabled).  Otherwise Kuid (the user authcode) is used as the key to genereate
+ * the SIK.
+ *
+ * I am aware that the subscripts look backwards, but that is the way they are
+ * written in the spec.
+ * 
+ * param session [in/out] contains our input and output fields.
+ *
+ * returns 0 on success
+ *         1 on failure
+ */
+int
+lanplus_generate_sik(struct ipmi_session * session, struct ipmi_intf * intf)
+{
+	uint8_t * input_buffer;
+	int input_buffer_length, i;
+	uint8_t * input_key;
+	uint32_t mac_length;
+	
+
+	memset(session->v2_data.sik, 0, IPMI_SIK_BUFFER_SIZE);
+
+	if (session->v2_data.auth_alg == IPMI_AUTH_RAKP_NONE)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* We don't yet support other algorithms */
+	assert(session->v2_data.auth_alg == IPMI_AUTH_RAKP_HMAC_SHA1);
+
+	input_buffer_length =
+		16 +  /* Rm       */
+		16 +  /* Rc       */
+		1  +  /* ROLEm     */
+		1  +  /* ULENGTHm  */
+		strlen((const char *)session->username);
+
+	input_buffer = malloc(input_buffer_length);
+	if (input_buffer == NULL) {
+		lprintf(LOG_ERR, "ipmitool: malloc failure");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Fill the buffer.  I'm assuming that we're using the LSBF representation of the
+	 * multibyte numbers in use.
+	 */
+
+	/* Rm */
+	#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+		input_buffer[i] = session->v2_data.console_rand[16 - 1 - i];
+	#else
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+		input_buffer[i] = session->v2_data.console_rand[i];
+	#endif
+	
+
+	/* Rc */
+	#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+		input_buffer[16 + i] = session->v2_data.bmc_rand[16 - 1 - i];
+	#else
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+		input_buffer[16 + i] = session->v2_data.bmc_rand[i];
+	#endif
+
+	/* ROLEm */
+	input_buffer[32] = session->v2_data.requested_role;
+
+	if (ipmi_oem_active(intf, "i82571spt")) {
+		/*
+		 * The HMAC calculation code in the Intel 82571 GbE
+		 * skips this bit!  Looks like a GbE bug, but we need
+		 * to work around it here anyway...
+		 */
+		input_buffer[32] &= ~0x10;
+	}
+
+	/* ULENGTHm */
+	input_buffer[33] = strlen((const char *)session->username);
+
+	/* USERNAME */
+	for (i = 0; i < input_buffer[33]; ++i)
+		input_buffer[34 + i] = session->username[i];
+
+	if (session->v2_data.kg[0])
+	{
+		/* We will be hashing with Kg */
+		/*
+		 * Section 13.31 of the IPMI v2 spec describes the SIK creation
+		 * using Kg.  It specifies that Kg should not be truncated.
+		 * Kg is set in ipmi_intf.
+		 */
+		input_key        = session->v2_data.kg;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* We will be hashing with Kuid */
+		input_key        = session->authcode;
+	}
+
+	
+	if (verbose >= 2)
+		printbuf((const uint8_t *)input_buffer, input_buffer_length, "session integrity key input");
+
+	lanplus_HMAC(session->v2_data.auth_alg,
+				 input_key,
+				 IPMI_AUTHCODE_BUFFER_SIZE,
+				 input_buffer,
+				 input_buffer_length,
+				 session->v2_data.sik,
+				 &mac_length);
+
+	free(input_buffer);
+	input_buffer = NULL;
+	assert(mac_length == 20);
+
+	/*
+	 * The key MAC generated is 20 bytes, but we will only be using the first
+	 * 12 for SHA1 96
+	 */
+	if (verbose >= 2)
+		printbuf(session->v2_data.sik, 20, "Generated session integrity key");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * lanplus_generate_k1
+ *
+ * Generate K1, the key presumably used to generate integrity authcodes
+ *
+ * We use the authentication algorithm to generated the HMAC, using
+ * the session integrity key (SIK) as our key.
+ *
+ * param session [in/out].
+ *
+ * returns 0 on success
+ *         1 on failure
+ */
+int
+lanplus_generate_k1(struct ipmi_session * session)
+{
+	uint32_t mac_length;
+
+	uint8_t CONST_1[] =
+		{0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+		 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01};
+
+	if (session->v2_data.auth_alg == IPMI_AUTH_RAKP_NONE)
+		memcpy(session->v2_data.k1, CONST_1, 20);
+	else
+	{
+		lanplus_HMAC(session->v2_data.auth_alg,
+					 session->v2_data.sik,
+					 IPMI_SIK_BUFFER_SIZE, /* SIK length */
+					 CONST_1,
+					 20,
+					 session->v2_data.k1,
+					 &mac_length);
+		assert(mac_length == 20);
+	}
+
+	if (verbose >= 2)
+		printbuf(session->v2_data.k1, 20, "Generated K1");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * lanplus_generate_k2
+ *
+ * Generate K2, the key used for RMCP+ AES encryption.
+ *
+ * We use the authentication algorithm to generated the HMAC, using
+ * the session integrity key (SIK) as our key.
+ *
+ * param session [in/out].
+ *
+ * returns 0 on success
+ *         1 on failure
+ */
+int
+lanplus_generate_k2(struct ipmi_session * session)
+{
+	uint32_t mac_length;
+
+	uint8_t CONST_2[] =
+		{0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02,
+		 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02};
+
+	if (session->v2_data.auth_alg == IPMI_AUTH_RAKP_NONE)
+		memcpy(session->v2_data.k2, CONST_2, 20);
+	else
+	{
+		lanplus_HMAC(session->v2_data.auth_alg,
+					 session->v2_data.sik,
+					 IPMI_SIK_BUFFER_SIZE, /* SIK length */
+					 CONST_2,
+					 20,
+					 session->v2_data.k2,
+					 &mac_length);
+		assert(mac_length == 20);
+	}
+
+	if (verbose >= 2)
+		printbuf(session->v2_data.k2, 20, "Generated K2");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * lanplus_encrypt_payload
+ *
+ * Perform the appropriate encryption on the input data.  Output the encrypted
+ * data to output, including the required confidentiality header and trailer.
+ * If the crypt_alg is IPMI_CRYPT_NONE, simply copy the input to the output and
+ * set bytes_written to input_length.
+ * 
+ * param crypt_alg specifies the encryption algorithm (from table 13-19 of the
+ *       IPMI v2 spec)
+ * param key is the used as input to the encryption algorithmf
+ * param input is the input data to be encrypted
+ * param input_length is the length of the input data to be encrypted
+ * param output is the cipher text generated by the encryption process
+ * param bytes_written is the number of bytes written during the encryption
+ *       process
+ *
+ * returns 0 on success
+ *         1 on failure
+ */
+int
+lanplus_encrypt_payload(uint8_t crypt_alg,
+		const uint8_t * key, const uint8_t * input,
+		uint32_t input_length, uint8_t * output,
+		uint16_t * bytes_written)
+{
+	uint8_t * padded_input;
+	uint32_t    mod, i, bytes_encrypted;
+	uint8_t   pad_length = 0;
+
+	if (crypt_alg == IPMI_CRYPT_NONE)
+	{
+		/* Just copy the input to the output */
+		*bytes_written = input_length;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	
+	/* Currently, we only support AES */
+	assert(crypt_alg == IPMI_CRYPT_AES_CBC_128);
+	assert(input_length <= IPMI_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
+
+
+	/*
+	 * The input to the AES encryption algorithm has to be a multiple of the
+	 * block size (16 bytes).  The extra byte we are adding is the pad length
+	 * byte.
+	 */
+	mod = (input_length + 1) % IPMI_CRYPT_AES_CBC_128_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	if (mod)
+		pad_length = IPMI_CRYPT_AES_CBC_128_BLOCK_SIZE - mod;
+
+	padded_input = (uint8_t*)malloc(input_length + pad_length + 1);
+	if (padded_input == NULL) {
+		lprintf(LOG_ERR, "ipmitool: malloc failure");
+		return 1;
+	}
+	memcpy(padded_input, input, input_length);
+
+	/* add the pad */
+	for (i = 0; i < pad_length; ++i)
+		padded_input[input_length + i] = i + 1;
+
+	/* add the pad length */
+	padded_input[input_length + pad_length] = pad_length;
+
+	/* Generate an initialization vector, IV, for the encryption process */
+	if (lanplus_rand(output, IPMI_CRYPT_AES_CBC_128_BLOCK_SIZE))
+	{
+		lprintf(LOG_ERR, "lanplus_encrypt_payload: Error generating IV");
+		if (padded_input != NULL) {
+			free(padded_input);
+			padded_input = NULL;
+		}
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (verbose > 2)
+		printbuf(output, IPMI_CRYPT_AES_CBC_128_BLOCK_SIZE, ">> Initialization vector");
+
+
+
+	lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(output,                                     /* IV              */
+								key,                                        /* K2              */
+								padded_input,                               /* Data to encrypt */
+								input_length + pad_length + 1,              /* Input length    */
+								output + IPMI_CRYPT_AES_CBC_128_BLOCK_SIZE, /* output          */
+								&bytes_encrypted);                          /* bytes written   */
+
+	*bytes_written =
+		IPMI_CRYPT_AES_CBC_128_BLOCK_SIZE + /* IV */
+		bytes_encrypted;
+
+	free(padded_input);
+	padded_input = NULL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * lanplus_has_valid_auth_code
+ *
+ * Determine whether the packets authcode field is valid for packet.
+ * 
+ * We always return success if any of the following are true. 
+ *  - this is not an IPMIv2 packet
+ *  - the session is not yet active
+ *  - the packet specifies that it is not authenticated
+ *  - the integrity algorithm agreed upon during session creation is "none"
+ *
+ * The authcode is computed using the specified integrity algorithm starting
+ * with the AuthType / Format field, and ending with the field immediately
+ * preceeding the authcode itself.
+ *
+ * The key key used to generate the authcode MAC is K1.
+ * 
+ * param rs holds the response structure.
+ * param session holds our session state, including our chosen algorithm, key, etc.
+ *
+ * returns 1 on success (authcode is valid)
+ *         0 on failure (autchode integrity check failed)
+ */
+int
+lanplus_has_valid_auth_code(struct ipmi_rs * rs, struct ipmi_session * session)
+{
+	uint8_t * bmc_authcode;
+	uint8_t generated_authcode[IPMI_MAX_MAC_SIZE];
+	uint32_t generated_authcode_length;
+	
+
+	if ((rs->session.authtype != IPMI_SESSION_AUTHTYPE_RMCP_PLUS) ||
+		(session->v2_data.session_state != LANPLUS_STATE_ACTIVE)  ||
+		(! rs->session.bAuthenticated)                            ||
+		(session->v2_data.integrity_alg == IPMI_INTEGRITY_NONE))
+		return 1;
+	
+	/* We only support SHA1-96 now */
+	assert(session->v2_data.integrity_alg == IPMI_INTEGRITY_HMAC_SHA1_96);
+
+	/*
+	 * For SHA1-96, the authcode will be the last 12 bytes in the packet
+	 */
+	bmc_authcode = rs->data + (rs->data_len - IPMI_SHA1_AUTHCODE_SIZE);
+
+	lanplus_HMAC(session->v2_data.integrity_alg,
+				 session->v2_data.k1,
+				 IPMI_AUTHCODE_BUFFER_SIZE,
+				 rs->data + IPMI_LANPLUS_OFFSET_AUTHTYPE,
+				 rs->data_len - IPMI_LANPLUS_OFFSET_AUTHTYPE - IPMI_SHA1_AUTHCODE_SIZE,
+				 generated_authcode,
+				 &generated_authcode_length);
+
+	if (verbose > 3)
+	{
+		lprintf(LOG_DEBUG+2, "Validating authcode");
+		printbuf(session->v2_data.k1, 20, "K1");
+		printbuf(rs->data + IPMI_LANPLUS_OFFSET_AUTHTYPE,
+				 rs->data_len - IPMI_LANPLUS_OFFSET_AUTHTYPE - IPMI_SHA1_AUTHCODE_SIZE,
+				 "Authcode Input Data");
+		printbuf(generated_authcode, 12, "Generated authcode");
+		printbuf(bmc_authcode,       12, "Expected authcode");
+	}
+
+	
+	assert(generated_authcode_length == 20);
+	return (memcmp(bmc_authcode, generated_authcode, 12) == 0);
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * lanplus_decrypt_payload
+ *
+ * 
+ * param input points to the beginning of the payload (which will be the IV if
+ *       we are using AES)
+ * param payload_size [out] will be set to the size of the payload EXCLUDING
+ * padding
+ * 
+ * returns 0 on success (we were able to successfully decrypt the packet)
+ *         1 on failure (we were unable to successfully decrypt the packet)
+ */
+int
+lanplus_decrypt_payload(uint8_t crypt_alg, const uint8_t * key,
+		const uint8_t * input, uint32_t input_length,
+		uint8_t * output, uint16_t * payload_size)
+{
+	uint8_t * decrypted_payload;
+	uint32_t    bytes_decrypted;
+
+	if (crypt_alg == IPMI_CRYPT_NONE)
+	{
+		/* We are not encrypted.  The paylaod size is is everything. */
+		*payload_size = input_length;
+		memmove(output, input, input_length);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* We only support AES */
+	assert(crypt_alg == IPMI_CRYPT_AES_CBC_128);
+
+	decrypted_payload = (uint8_t*)malloc(input_length);
+	if (decrypted_payload == NULL) {
+		lprintf(LOG_ERR, "ipmitool: malloc failure");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+
+	lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(input,                                /* IV              */
+								key,                                  /* Key             */
+								input                        +
+								IPMI_CRYPT_AES_CBC_128_BLOCK_SIZE,    /* Data to decrypt */
+								input_length -
+								IPMI_CRYPT_AES_CBC_128_BLOCK_SIZE,    /* Input length    */
+								decrypted_payload,                    /* output          */
+								&bytes_decrypted);                    /* bytes written   */
+
+	if (bytes_decrypted != 0)
+	{
+		/* Success */
+		uint8_t conf_pad_length;
+		int i;
+
+		memmove(output,
+				decrypted_payload,
+				bytes_decrypted);
+
+		/*
+		 * We have to determine the payload size, by substracting the padding, etc.
+		 * The last byte of the decrypted payload is the confidentiality pad length.
+		 */
+		conf_pad_length = decrypted_payload[bytes_decrypted - 1];
+		*payload_size = bytes_decrypted - conf_pad_length - 1;
+
+		/*
+		 * Extra test to make sure that the padding looks like it should (should start
+		 * with 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, etc...
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < conf_pad_length; ++i)
+		{
+			if (decrypted_payload[*payload_size + i] != (i + 1))
+			{
+				lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Malformed payload padding");
+				assert(0);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		lprintf(LOG_ERR, "ERROR: lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128 decryptd 0 bytes");
+		assert(0);
+	}
+
+	free(decrypted_payload);
+	decrypted_payload = NULL;
+	return (bytes_decrypted == 0);
+}